The UN-Baghdad Bombing – A More Than Two-Decade United Nations Cover-up?
19 August will mark the anniversary of a date that is seared forever in my memory. It was a blisteringly hot late summer afternoon in 2003 when a jihadist suicide bomber drove a flatbed truck carrying more than a ton of explosives into our UN headquarters in Iraq (the Canal Hotel), killing twenty-two staff members and visitors, and wounding more than one-hundred fifty others, including my wife, who was then working for the World Food Program. The terrible event left permanent psychological and emotional scars from which complete recovery seems unlikely.
World-famous UN Under-Secretary General Sergio Vieira de Mello died in the attack. Often considered a frontrunner for the UN’s most senior post, De Mello was then acting as a political envoy to Iraq for the Secretary General (SG). He never got his shot at the big chair. The assault devastated the UN and dominated the international news cycle for three days following. The tragedy still haunts me because the UN’s full investigative report was never released. No explanation was ever given for making the report a closely held secret.
This attack marks the most egregious failure of UN security management in its history. I use the phrase “failure of UN security management” because the UN security service, then and now, is composed of advisors, not decision-makers. I fear that critically important lessons learned from this tragedy have never been integrated at the highest levels because the complete report was declared “UN Confidential” by then Secretary General Kofi Annan. He released only finely cherry-picked extracts in March 2004. The whole document with exhibits should of course be immediately declassified by the UN’s current SG. But there is more. The families of the dead and wounded were never told the truth about what really happened. They are owed the facts.
For some, the bombing came as no surprise. It was anticipated by my staff and me in the months leading up to the attack. Moreover, every senior UN security professional then serving in the country, the Iraq Security Cell, agreed. As advisors to senior UN management, we collectively warned the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, Mr. Ramiro Lopez Da Silva, who was the in-country administrator of the later proven massively corrupted Iraq Oil for Food Program, and his predecessor in that same posting, Mr. Tun Myat, then serving as the UN Security Coordinator in New York. Our multiple formal written warnings and recommendations to mitigate the identified perils were ignored. Despite the growing danger and against my advice, more defenseless staff members were permitted to be dispatched to Baghdad by the SG’s Office in the days and weeks prior to the attack.
Unsurprisingly, the US Army in Iraq fully recognized our growing vulnerability. Years later, I personally communicated with the commanding officer of the unit responsible for the security zone occupied by the UN headquarters, Major General (retired) Brad May, then a colonel. He directed that the premises be secured by his soldiers in late June — closing off the road that was later used by the suicide bomber — an artery that I had twice previously recommended be barricaded. Although I was unaware of it then, someone perceived as a high UN authority ordered the enhanced military security off the perimeter. This fact was subsequently confirmed in a conversation with the US Administrator of Iraq, Ambassador Paul Bremer. Regrettably, he can’t remember who made the call. Over two decades later, it is still not known who made this fatally flawed decision. No doubt somebody knows, but they aren’t talking.
The people later tasked with examining the bombing in closest detail, the Security in Iraq Accountability Panel (SIAP), consisted of Mr. Gerald Walzer (chair), Mr. Sinha Basnayake, Mr. Kevin Carty, and Mr. Stuart Groves. This panel was supposed to be independent. It wasn’t. The SG retained control. The Panel offered conclusions at the end of the full report (over 100 pages), including, “It is probable that if the security measures that were recommended by the security staff were implemented in a full and urgent manner, the number of casualties would have been considerably reduced.” This quote — and others like it — were not in the extracts released by Annan. I know this because a former senior UN staff member provided me a copy of what appears to be a near-final draft of the full report, lacking exhibits, while researching a book that addresses the attack and its aftermath in several of its concluding chapters. That book, now released in a second edition, is entitled “Surviving the United Nations: A true story of violence, corruption, betrayal, and redemption.” It provides significant information never seen about the bombing.
Here is still more from the SIAP: “…the UN security officers on the ground in Baghdad can not (sic) be held responsible for the clear failure to recognize the clear warning signs…”
Yet I was fired, even though I had previously objected to entering Iraq on 1 May 2003; the following month in Baghdad, I recommended establishing a limiting staff ceiling that was never approved; in late June I stated formally before the Baghdad Security Management Team that “it is only a matter of time until the UN is attacked;” and four weeks later I wrote to New York in email, “The security situation in Iraq is dynamic. The current threat is real.” The panel goes on to express my personal feelings at the time, saying “The danger was recognized by the UN security community in Iraq and there were signs that security officers suffered extreme frustration when their warnings were unheeded.” One could reasonably ask the question, why?
19 August will mark the anniversary of a date that is seared forever in my memory. It was a blisteringly hot late summer afternoon in 2003 when a jihadist suicide bomber drove a flatbed truck carrying more than a ton of explosives into our UN headquarters in Iraq (the Canal Hotel), killing twenty-two staff members and visitors, and wounding more than one-hundred fifty others, including my wife, who was then working for the World Food Program. The terrible event left permanent psychological and emotional scars from which complete recovery seems unlikely.
World-famous UN Under-Secretary General Sergio Vieira de Mello died in the attack. Often considered a frontrunner for the UN’s most senior post, De Mello was then acting as a political envoy to Iraq for the Secretary General (SG). He never got his shot at the big chair. The assault devastated the UN and dominated the international news cycle for three days following. The tragedy still haunts me because the UN’s full investigative report was never released. No explanation was ever given for making the report a closely held secret.
This attack marks the most egregious failure of UN security management in its history. I use the phrase “failure of UN security management” because the UN security service, then and now, is composed of advisors, not decision-makers. I fear that critically important lessons learned from this tragedy have never been integrated at the highest levels because the complete report was declared “UN Confidential” by then Secretary General Kofi Annan. He released only finely cherry-picked extracts in March 2004. The whole document with exhibits should of course be immediately declassified by the UN’s current SG. But there is more. The families of the dead and wounded were never told the truth about what really happened. They are owed the facts.
For some, the bombing came as no surprise. It was anticipated by my staff and me in the months leading up to the attack. Moreover, every senior UN security professional then serving in the country, the Iraq Security Cell, agreed. As advisors to senior UN management, we collectively warned the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, Mr. Ramiro Lopez Da Silva, who was the in-country administrator of the later proven massively corrupted Iraq Oil for Food Program, and his predecessor in that same posting, Mr. Tun Myat, then serving as the UN Security Coordinator in New York. Our multiple formal written warnings and recommendations to mitigate the identified perils were ignored. Despite the growing danger and against my advice, more defenseless staff members were permitted to be dispatched to Baghdad by the SG’s Office in the days and weeks prior to the attack.
Unsurprisingly, the US Army in Iraq fully recognized our growing vulnerability. Years later, I personally communicated with the commanding officer of the unit responsible for the security zone occupied by the UN headquarters, Major General (retired) Brad May, then a colonel. He directed that the premises be secured by his soldiers in late June — closing off the road that was later used by the suicide bomber — an artery that I had twice previously recommended be barricaded. Although I was unaware of it then, someone perceived as a high UN authority ordered the enhanced military security off the perimeter. This fact was subsequently confirmed in a conversation with the US Administrator of Iraq, Ambassador Paul Bremer. Regrettably, he can’t remember who made the call. Over two decades later, it is still not known who made this fatally flawed decision. No doubt somebody knows, but they aren’t talking.
The people later tasked with examining the bombing in closest detail, the Security in Iraq Accountability Panel (SIAP), consisted of Mr. Gerald Walzer (chair), Mr. Sinha Basnayake, Mr. Kevin Carty, and Mr. Stuart Groves. This panel was supposed to be independent. It wasn’t. The SG retained control. The Panel offered conclusions at the end of the full report (over 100 pages), including, “It is probable that if the security measures that were recommended by the security staff were implemented in a full and urgent manner, the number of casualties would have been considerably reduced.” This quote — and others like it — were not in the extracts released by Annan. I know this because a former senior UN staff member provided me a copy of what appears to be a near-final draft of the full report, lacking exhibits, while researching a book that addresses the attack and its aftermath in several of its concluding chapters. That book, now released in a second edition, is entitled “Surviving the United Nations: A true story of violence, corruption, betrayal, and redemption.” It provides significant information never seen about the bombing.
Here is still more from the SIAP: “…the UN security officers on the ground in Baghdad can not (sic) be held responsible for the clear failure to recognize the clear warning signs…”
Yet I was fired, even though I had previously objected to entering Iraq on 1 May 2003; the following month in Baghdad, I recommended establishing a limiting staff ceiling that was never approved; in late June I stated formally before the Baghdad Security Management Team that “it is only a matter of time until the UN is attacked;” and four weeks later I wrote to New York in email, “The security situation in Iraq is dynamic. The current threat is real.” The panel goes on to express my personal feelings at the time, saying “The danger was recognized by the UN security community in Iraq and there were signs that security officers suffered extreme frustration when their warnings were unheeded.” One could reasonably ask the question, why?
I eventually testified nine times before the SIAP: more than anyone else. I hoped for justice. I eventually suffered an avalanche of disappointment. Panel member Mr. Groves reviewed this article in its entirety, confirming its accuracy regarding all matters relating to the SIAP Report. In doing so, he violated his oath of confidentiality to support my research, saying, “I want to do the right thing.” It is troubling that he felt compelled to violate his UN oath to help me bring the truth to light.
Annan appointed the SIAP while ensuring that he would deny access to critically important evidence. In other words, the Panel was never given access to all the information. According to Groves, the investigators were not permitted to examine the correspondence of the SG and his key subordinate, the chief of staff, Mr. Iqbal Riza, relating to the period leading up to the attack. I spoke with Mr. Robert Turner, operations officer, who was present in Baghdad when Riza applied pressure to Da Silva to allow more staff in Baghdad.
After my book was first published in 2020, a woman who had read it reached out to tell me that the SIAP Report could be found on the UN website. I immediately clicked on the link that she sent. What I found was troubling. Instead of the full report, what popped up was the 40-plus page cherry-picked extracts of the document, only now, the word “extracts” had been excised. My reader thought that she was looking at the full report, which was perhaps the idea — further evidence of an ongoing cover-up?
In the early autumn of 2004, following a bruising seven-month administrative and legal battle with Annan, I was successful in defending myself against the unjustified relief action: winning full exoneration and reinstatement of my former position and rank. Frankly, there was a veritable cornucopia of evidence in my favor, and unsurprisingly, most was already on the record in the SIAP Report that nobody to date has been able to read. I authored the book to set the record straight. I felt driven to find answers to the questions that plagued me ever since the fateful day that shattered my life, while prematurely ending the lives of so many others. Every senior UN staff member at the time who may have been knowledgeable of these events refused to speak with me on record, including the now deceased former SG.
Why was I targeted and made a scapegoat? One possibility following two decades of thought: at a meeting of UN management in Baghdad following the attack, attended by Annan’s chief of staff, Mr. Riza, I refused to permit the attendees to absolve themselves of blame and whitewash the deaths and wounding of so many, making me a potential whistle-blower. The UN track record with whistle-blowers, even potential ones, is reportedly abysmal. Also, and perhaps more to the point, if the security community, which I represented in Iraq was not responsible, then it could only have been senior UN management that was to blame.
Another surprising matter arose while I researched my book. The US intelligence community had strong indications that the Canal Hotel would suffer an extremist attack, and well before the bombing. If true, why wasn’t the UN warned? Would the answer be in the full final report and exhibits?
Why did I decide not to include the version of the SIAP Report in my possession in my book? If I had done so, it would be a clear violation of my UN oath. I only published those few quotes that directly impacted me. This is a task for the current SG, Mr. Guterres. He can release the full SIAP Report with exhibits with the stroke of his pen. Key security lessons learned could finally be integrated into the UN security structure. Moreover, the families of the deceased deserve to know why their loved ones died.
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*** Editor’s Note: If you liked this article, you’ll definitely want to check out Bob’s latest book: Surviving the United Nations – A True Story of Violence, Corruption, Betrayal, and Redemption.
It’s an eye-opening account of a Green Beret’s second career at the United Nations.
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“In his humanitarian and peacekeeping missions for the United Nations he dealt with child soldiers, blood diamonds, a double hostage-taking, an invasion by brutal guerrillas, an emergency aerial evacuation, a desperate hostage recovery mission, tribal gunfights, refugee camp violence, suicide bombings, and institutional corruption. His UN career brought him face to face with the best and worst of human nature, and he shares it all here.”
Click the link above to pick up your copy from Amazon today. You’ll find it every bit as riveting as the author himself. – GDM
